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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
A noteworthy fact in reference to recent treasury decisions is the
number that have to do with deciding questions brought forward by uncon
vinced taxpayers upon the subject of deductible losses on sales of property
acquired prior to March 1, 1913, and sold subsequent thereto. It would
seem that the decision in the Walsh v. Brewster case, in which the manner
of determining deductible gains and losses on such transactions was dealt
with in considerable detail, would have been accepted long since, but here
we have the subject brought up for the court’s consideration again in the
case of Ludington v. Blakely, embodied in treasury decision 3496. The
repeated publications of decisions of like character upon the same question
probably is not desirable but in this treasury decision we have found a
sentence or two that seems worthy of careful consideration. They are
quoted as follows, in reference to the sixteenth amendment:
“ * * * the act was to operate on gains and losses accruing sub
sequent to the adoption of the amendment. But in selecting this
method of accomplishing the result congress did not intend to
impose a tax on mere fictitious or paper profit, or to permit the
deduction of a mere fictitious or paper loss. Only actual gains are
taxed; only actual losses are deductible.”
The intended meaning of this definition is quite clear though the definition
seems not to be satisfying as such. It would seem that the definition
would be improved if the court had argued that: “Only actual gains over
fair market value as of March 1, 1913, are taxed; only actual losses are
deductible.” However, this may be only meticulous quibbling.
Another treasury decision of interest is No. 3500 published this month
in which the supreme court of the District of Columbia rules that mandamus
will not lie to compel the commissioner of internal revenue to approve a
change in a taxpayer’s accounting period. The last foregoing sentence does
not accurately describe the ruling as the facts in the particular case may
have had some bearing upon the decision. It would appear from a reading
of this case that the taxpayer had voluntarily changed its accounting period
from a calendar year basis to a fiscal year basis; had filed returns accord
ingly and then sought to change back to a calendar year basis. It also
appears that it was through error that the taxpayer had changed from a
calendar to a fiscal year basis and that upon discovery of the error amended
returns had been submitted upon a calendar year basis. It was through
the efforts of the taxpayer to compel the commissioner to accept the
amended returns in lieu of the former ones that this decision was made.
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3496—July 11, 1923)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Deductions—Losses on Sales of Property Acquired Before March
1, 1913.
The deductible loss for income-tax purposes under the revenue act of
1918 in the case of property acquired prior to March 1, 1913, and sold sub
sequent thereto can never exceed the actual loss or excess of cost over sale
price. The fact of actual loss must first be found and resort had to section
202 of the act solely for the purpose of determining the deductible amount
thereof.
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2. Losses—Cost Less Than March 1, 1913, Value.
The deductible loss in the case of property acquired prior to March 1,
1913, and sold after that date at a price less than the cost thereof, the cost
being less than the value on March 1, 1913, is the difference between the
cost and sale price and not the difference between March 1, 1913, value and
sale price.
The attached decision of the United States district court for the eastern
district of Pennsylvania in the case of Charles H. Ludington v. McCaughn,
collector, is published for the information of internal revenue officers and
others concerned.
District Court of the United States, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
Charles H. Ludington, plaintiff, v. Blakely D. McCaughn, collector of
internal revenue, defendant.
(June 15, 1923)
McKeehan, district judge: The plaintiff sues to recover $3,094, the
amount of an additional income tax assessed against him for the calendar
year 1919 and paid under protest. Prior to March 1, 1913, he purchased
certain securities for $32,500 and sold them in 1919 for $3,866.91. Thus the
difference between the cost and the selling price, the actual loss was
$28,633.09. The selling price, however, was $33,183.09 less than the market
price of the securities on March 1, 1913. In his income return the plaintiff
claimed the latter sum as a deduction and the commissioner reduced the
amount of the deduction to the actual loss, thereby increasing the plaintiff’s
tax by $3,094.
The plaintiff stands upon the letter of section 202 of the revenue act
of 1918 (approved February 24, 1919, 40 Stat. 1060-1067) and insists that
if it means what it says he is entitled to the deduction he claimed. This
section provides:
Sec. 202 (a). That for the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived
or the loss sustained from the sale or other disposition of property,
real, personal, or mixed, the basis shall be—
(1) In the case of property acquired before March 1, 1913, the
fair market price or value of such property as of that date; and
(2) In the case of property acquired on or after that date, the
cost thereof; * * *
This provision, standing alone, gives color to the plaintiff’s contention,
but not when considered in relation to the sixteenth amendment and in
relation to other provisions of the act. The grant of power extended
only to the taxation of actual income. The act intended to tax only actual
income, which means actual gross income less the deductions specified in
the act. Included in gross income are “gains, profits, whether real or
personal.” And among the deductions allowed are “losses sustained during
the calendar year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, if
incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected
with the trade or business.” The adoption of the sixteenth amendment
was proclaimed by the secretary of state on February 25, 1913, and in
order that gains and losses that had accrued prior to that time should be
excluded in the computation of “income,” the market price as of March 1,
1913, was selected as the basis for computing gains and losses as to property
acquired prior thereto. In other words, the act was to operate only on
gains and losses accruing subsequent to the adoption of the amendment.
But in selecting this method of accomplishing the result, congress did not
intend to impose a tax on a mere fictitious or paper profit, or to permit the
deduction of a mere fictitious or paper loss. Only actual gains are taxed,
only actual losses are deductible. The intent and purpose of section 202
is this: That where a part but not all of an actual gain accrues after
March 1, 1913, only so much as accrues after that date is income, and
where a part but not all of an actual loss accrues after March 1, 1913,
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only so much as accrues after that date is deductible. It is a limitation
upon the amount of gains that are taxed and of losses that are deductible.
Given an actual gain or loss, the market value on March 1, 1913, was
selected as a reasonable criterion for determining how much, if any, of
the gain or loss accrued subsequent to the adoption of the amendment.
In Welsh v. Brewster (255 U. S. 536), one of the transactions before
the court involved securities that Walsh purchased in 1902 and 1903 for
$231,300 and sold in 1916 for $276,150, an actual gain of $44,850. Their
market value on March 1, 1913, however, was only $164,480, and the col
lector assessed the tax upon $111,670, being the difference between that
market value and the selling price. The decision was that the assessment
was illegal and that Walsh was taxable only on his actual gain of $44,850.
Another transaction involved in the Walsh case was the purchase of
securities in 1899 for $191,000 and their sale in 1916 for the same amount
Their market value on March 1, 1913, however, was only $151,854. The
decision was that a tax assessed on the difference between that amount and
the selling price was illegal, no actual gain having been realized. In
Goodrich v. Edwards (255 U. S. 527), one of the transactions had reference
to securities that had been purchased in 1912 for $500 and sold in 1916 for
$13,931.22. The market value on March 1, 1913, was $695. Thus there
was an actual gain of $13,431.22, but only $13,236.22 of it had accrued
subsequent to March 1, 1913. The decision was that the tax was properly
assessed on the latter amount. The other transaction involved in the
Goodrich case was a block of securities purchased in 1912 for $291,600 and
sold in 1916 for $269,346, an actual loss of $22,254. The market value on
March 1, 1912 (1913), however, was only $148,635, so that the taxpayer
had a paper profit of $120,711 on the basis of March 1, 1913, value. The
decision was that an actual loss having been sustained, a tax assessed upon
the paper profit was illegal. Whether the taxpayer could have claimed a
deduction for his actual loss of $22,254 was not before the court and was
not decided.
The questions decided in these cases had to do with gains not losses,
and the cases arose under the income-tax law of 1916. But the provisions
of that act on this question differed only in arrangement and not in sub
stance with the act of 1918. Section 2 (c) of the act of 1916 provided
that “for the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale” of
property acquired prior to March 1, 1913, the fair market price as of the
date “shall be the basis for determining the amount of such gain derived,”
and section 5, in dealing with allowable deductions, provided that “for the
purpose of ascertaining the loss sustained from the sale” of property
acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair market price as of that date “shall
be the basis for determining the amount of such loss sustained.” Thus,
under the act of 1916, losses were to be computed in the same way as gains,
and these provisions were substantially reenacted in section 202 of the act
of 1918. So, I think that the supreme court’s construction of the compu
tation of “gains” applies equally to the computation of “losses” under the
act of 1918.
The plaintiff, therefore, was not entitled to a deduction in excess of
his actual loss, and the additional tax of $3,094 was properly assessed.
Judgment may be entered for the defendant.
(T. D. 3499—July 20, 1923)
Distribution out of earnings or profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913.
Article 1543 of Regulations 62 amended—T. D. 3478 revoked and
T. D. 3475 affirmed.
Article 1543 of Regulations 62 is hereby amended to read as follows
(the italic is not a part of the amended article, but is used to indicate the
additions and changes made by the amendment) :
Art. 1543. Distribution out of earnings or profits accumulated prior
to March 1, 1913.—Any distribution by a corporation out of earnings or
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profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913, or out of increase in value of
property accrued prior to March 1, 1913 (whether or not realized by sale
or other disposition prior to March 1, 1913), is not a dividend within the
meaning of the act The provisions of the preceding sentence shall be
applied uniformly to cases arising under the revenue act of 1916, the
revenue act of 1917, and the revenue act of 1918, as well as the revenue
act of 1921. A corporation can not distribute earnings or profits accumu
lated or increase in value of property accrued prior to March 1, 1913,
unless and until all earnings or profits accumulated since February 28, 1913,
have been distributed. Whenever one corporation receives from another
corporation distributions out of earnings or profits accumulated by such
other corporation prior to March 1, 1913, or out of increase in value of its
property accrued prior to March 1, 1913, and the “receiving” corporation,
after having first distributed all of its earnings and profits accumulated
since February 28, 1913, distributes to its stockholders the amount so
received by it from such other corporation, the distribution by the
“receiving” corporation to its stockholders is not a dividend within the
meaning of the act and is exempt from tax.
In determining whether a dividend is out of earnings or profits accumu
lated since February 28, 1913, or prior to March 1, 1913, due consideration
must be given to the facts, and mere bookkeeping entries increasing or
decreasing surplus will not be conclusive.
A distribution made by a corporation out of earnings or profits
accumulated or increase in value of property accrued prior to March 1,
1913, is exempt from tax, even if in excess of the cost or other basis
provided in articles 1561-1563 and 1568, of the stock on which declared.
However, where any tax-free distribution out of earnings or profits accum
ulated or increase in value of property accrued prior to March 1, 1913,
has been made, the distributee can not deduct any loss from the sale or
other disposition of the stock unless, and then only to the extent that the
cost, or other basis, exceeds the sum of (1) the amount realized from the
sale or other disposition of the stock, and (2) the aggregate amount of
such distributions received by him thereon. The provisions of this para
graph are also applicable to a distribution by a “receiving” corporation
made under the conditions set forth in the first paragraph of this article,
and to the distributees in deducting any loss from the sale or other
disposition of stock in the “receiving” corporation.
Example.—A purchased certain stock subsequent to March 1, 1913,
for $10,000 and received in 1921 a distribution thereon of $2,000, paid out
of the earnings or profits of the corporation accumulated prior to March 1,
1913. This distribution does not constitute taxable income to A. If A
subsequently sells the stock for $6,000 a deductible loss of $2,000 is
sustained. If he sells the stock for $12,000, a taxable gain of $2,000 is
realized. No gain or loss is recognized if he sells the stock for an amount
ranging between $8,000 and $10,000.
Under date of May 9, 1923, T. D. 3475 was approved, amending article
1543 of regulations 62 to provide substantially as above set forth. On
May 14, 1923, no cases having been closed on the basis of T. D. 3475,
T. D. 3478 was issued revoking T. D. 3475, and the question involved in
the amendment was referred to the attorney general for opinion. His
opinion, dated June 21, 1923, has now been received, and is in entire accord
with the amendment originally effected by T. D. 3475. Accordingly T. D.
3478 is revoked, T. D. 3475 is approved, and article 1543 of regulations 62
is amended to read as hereinabove provided.

(T. D. 3500—July 23, 1923)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Mandamus—Amended Returns.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the exercise by the commissioner of
internal revenue of the power vested in him by section 212 of the revenue
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act of 1918 to approve a change in a taxpayer’s accounting period from a
fiscal year to a calendar year, or to accept amended returns.
2. Accounting Period—Change from Fiscal to Calendar Year.
Where a taxpayer voluntarily changed its accounting period from a
calendar to a fiscal-year basis and filed returns on this basis, mandamus
will not lie to compel the commissioner to accept amended returns on a
calendar-year basis.
The following decision of the supreme court of the District of
Columbia in the case of The Greylock Mills, a corporation, v. David H.
Blair, commissioner of internal revenue, is published for the information
of internal-revenue officers and others concerned:
In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
[Law No. 67451]
United States ex rel. The Greylock Mills, a corporation, petitioner, v.
David H. Blair, commissioner of internal revenue.
MEMORANDUM.

This is a petition for mandamus against respondent, filed March 8,
1923.
From the allegations set forth in the petition it appears that The
Greylock Mills, engaged in the manufacture of cotton goods, was incor
porated in 1880, under the laws of the State of Massachusetts, and has
its principal office in North Adams, in that state; that petitioner, now and
for many years past, regularly closed its books on the last day of March,
June, September, and December of each year and computed its income
accurately for each said quarter, a physical inventory being taken on the
last day of each such quarter; and that neither its charter nor by-laws
nor laws of the state of Massachusetts fixed for it any fiscal period.
That petitioner filed on a calendar-year basis all income and excess
profits tax returns required under the acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917, for the
years 1913 to 1917, inclusive; and that it did not elect to make any of
such returns upon the basis of other than a calendar year, although each
of the acts just mentioned provided that any corporation might designate
the last day of any month for the closing of its fiscal year, and thus be
entitled to have its tax computed upon the basis of a fiscal instead of a
calendar year.
That the revenue act of 1918 provided that return shall be made on or
before the 15th day of the third month following the close of the fiscal
year, or, if the return be made on the basis of the calendar year, the same
shall be made on or before the 15th day of March, and that the commis
sioner might grant a reasonable extension of time for filing returns, for
good cause shown, etc.
That the commissioner of internal revenue did not extend the time
for filing the return of petitioner, or of taxpayers generally, and required
payment on March 15, 1919, of the first installment of petitioner’s taxes
for the taxable year 1918; and that petitioner, on or before March 15, 1919,
filed its return for the calendar year 1918 on Form 1031—T, whereon it
estimated its tax as amounting to $266,000, and transmitted a payment of
$100,000 with its return.
The revenue act of 1918, supra, further provides that the net income
shall be computed on the basis of the taxpayer’s annual accounting year
(fiscal or calendar year, as the case may be) in accordance with the
method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such
taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been so employed, or
if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the compu
tation shall be made upon such basis and in such manner, as, in the opinion
of the commissioner, does clearly reflect the income, etc. Also that the
taxable year of the taxpayer means his fiscal year, or the calendar year if
he has not established a fiscal year; that the term “fiscal year” means an
accounting period of 12 months ending on the last day of any month other
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than December, and that no fiscal year will be recognized unless before
its close it was definitely established as an accounting period by the tax
payer and the books of the taxpayer were kept in accordance therewith;
further, that a taxpayer having an existing accounting period which is a
fiscal year within the meaning of the statute not only needs no permission
to make his return on the basis of such a taxable year but is required to
do so, regardless of the former basis of rendering returns; and a person
having no such fiscal year must make return on the basis of the calendar
year.
Petitioner further alleges that in previous years it had elected to file
its return on a calendar-year basis, and that in filing its returns on March
15, 1919, for the taxable year 1918 on a calendar-year basis it similarly elected
the calendar year as its annual accounting period; that petitioner’s annual
accounting period for the taxable year 1918 and for prior taxable years
was the calendar year, in accordance with the method of accounting regu
larly employed in keeping petitioner’s books ; that it clearly reflected the
petitioner’s income for such period; that petitioner did not for the taxable
year 1918 or for any subsequent taxable years change its annual accounting
period from a calendar to a fiscal-year basis; that petitioner never requested
nor received permission or approval of the commissioner of internal
revenue to a change of its annual accounting period from a calendar to a
fiscal year, and that in 1918 and for many years prior thereto the books
of petitioner, which were closed quarterly, had been ruled down annually
on June 30.
Petitioner further alleges that at the time of preparing its revised and
completed return required to be filed on or before June 15, 1919, it engaged
certain auditors and accountants of Boston to prepare the same, and that
the latter erroneously interpreted certain provisions of the law of 1918,
supra, as requiring that petitioner’s return should have been filed upon the
basis of a fiscal year ending June 30, because its books had been ruled
down on that date, and thus it was that the revised and completed return
of petitioner for the taxable year 1918, filed June 14, 1919, was on the
basis of a fiscal year ending June 30, 1918.
Petitioner further alleges that thereafter and on May 25, 1921, there
was published a ruling of the commissioner of internal revenue, through
his committee on appeals and review [A. R. R. 501], in which it was held
that the mere fact that the books of a corporation were not ruled down
on December 31 does not preclude the corporation from filing returns on
the basis of a calendar year, provided that the books were closed on that
date and that such closing reflected the correct financial condition and net
income.
That by letter dated February 2, 1922, petitioner sought permission
from respondent to file amended returns for the taxable year 1918 and
subsequent years on a calendar-year basis, and that was followed by a
series of letters, rulings, appeals, etc., all finally terminating adverse to
the application of the petitioner, in which connection it appears that the
petitioner, prior to making request for permission to file amended returns
on the basis of a calendar year, had successively filed its returns on a fiscal
year basis not only for the year ending June 30, 1918, but for the succeed
ing years ending June 30, 1919, 1920, and 1921.
The prayer of the petition is for the usual rule to show cause why the
writ of mandamus should not issue and, finally, for a writ of mandamus
commanding respondent to accept petitioner’s amended income and profits
tax returns for the calendar year 1918 and for each subsequent calendar
year.
Upon the filing of the above petition rule to show cause issued, and
on April 27, 1923, respondent filed answer to the petition and to the rule
to show cause and from which answer the following is summarized:
That on March 14, 1919, the relator filed “tentative return and estimate
of corporation income and excess-profits taxes and request for extension
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of time for filing of returns” on Form 1031-T; that said return was not
final and complete for the calendar year 1918, for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 1918, or for any other taxable period.
That on June 14, 1919, relator filed “corporation income and profitstax return” on Form 1120 for the “fiscal period begun July 1, 1917, and
ended June 30, 1918,” showing amount of corporation income and excess
profits tax due for the fiscal period ended June 30, 1918, said return being
the regular and final return of corporation income and profits taxes filed
on the basis of a fiscal-year accounting period ending June 30, 1918, and
being a departure from the relator’s practice of filing such returns on the
basis of a calendar year accounting period ending December 31 of each
year, and the same was accepted by the respondent as the relator’s return
for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1918.
That the return filed by relator on March 14, 1919, was a “tentative
return and estimate,” as above, and the same was not the final and com
plete return of relator for the year 1918 and was not accepted by respondent
as such.
That the annual accounting period of relator for the taxable year 1918
and prior taxable years, in accordance with the • method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping petitioner’s books, was the fiscal year ending
June 30 and that it rules down its books on the 30th day of June each
year and makes an annual financial statement to the public as of that date
of each year, and its stockholders’ meetings are held during the month of
July of each year.
That by filing its return on June 14, 1919, of “corporation income and
profits tax” on Form 1120 for the “fiscal period begun July 1, 1917, and
ended June 30, 1918,” relator elected to abandon its practice of filing such
returns on a calendar-year basis and to adopt as its accounting period fiscal
year ending June 30, and that relator, for each taxable year since 1918,
namely, on the 30th day of June of the years 1919, 1920, 1921, and 1922,
has filed its returns of net income on the basis of such fiscal-year account
ing period, the dates of filing such returns being September 19, 1919, Sep
tember 18, 1920, September 15, 1921, and September 14, 1922, respectively,
and that the returns so filed have been accepted by respondent without
objection.
Respondent denies that he changed the accounting period of relator
from a calendar to a fiscal-year basis and states that he merely accepted
the change made by the relator itself.
Respondent admits that demand was made upon him for the accept
ance of amended returns on a calendar-year basis and that such demand
was refused, but he denies that such action was unwarranted under the act
of 1918, and avers that such refusal was pursuant to the power and
authority conferred upon him by law and regulations, and was done in
the exercise of his judgment and discretion as a public officer.
For further answer respondent states that the relator is seeking to
review a decision rendered by respondent in the course of administering
the internal-revenue laws of the United States; that such decision involved
the exercise of judgment and discretion; that respondent’s jurisdiction is
exclusive and not reviewable by this or any other court; that the action
taken by him was as an officer of and in the interests of the United States;
that the latter is an indispensable party to the action; that if respondent
be compelled by mandamus to accept amended returns of relator for 1918
and subsequent years the United States may be liable for the refund of
taxes to relator to the extent of many thousands of dollars, and that the
United States has not consented to be sued in this form of action; and,
finally, that by not seeking to enforce his alleged right until the filing of
this suit (March 8, 1923), or at least until the filing of application for
permission to amend said returns (February 2, 1922), relator has been
guilty of gross laches and is thereby barred of any right to the relief
sought, if any such right exer existed.
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Thereafter and on May 9, 1923, petitioner filed plea to the return
and answer of the respondent, the details of which, however, do not here
require statement, as there seems to be no particular controversy between
the parties as to the facts in the case, the real,point of controversy being
as to the correct legal conclusions to be drawn from such facts.
Following the filing of the above plea the respondent, May 21, 1923,
filed motion to strike out petitioner’s said plea, and each and every para
graph thereof, upon divers grounds not necessary here to be specially noted,
and also demurred to the plea or pleas as being bad in substance for the
reasons:
1. That the same admit the material averments of the answer and
allege no facts in avoidance thereof.
2. That it appears affirmatively therefrom that petitioner elected to
file its 1918 return on the basis of its fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, and
that under section 212-b of the revenue act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1057),
respondent is vested with discretion to withhold or grant his approval of
a change in such accounting period.
3. That it affirmatively appears therefrom that petitioner has been
guilty of such gross laches in seeking to enforce his alleged right to file
amended returns that he is thereby barred of any right to the relief sought
by him in this proceeding, if any such right ever existed.
The cause came on for oral argument before the court on June 1, 1923,
the same, by agreement of counsel, being limited to the demurrer above
mentioned, it being conceded that if said demurrer be well founded as a
matter of law, judgment of dismissal of the petition would follow.
The court has carefully considered the questions involved in the case,
not only as developed by the oral arguments of counsel, but also, and in
addition to those arguments, it has given careful thought and study to
said questions and has reached the conclusion that the demurrer of
respondent is well founded, and that the same should be and is sustained.
A. A. Hoehling, Justice.
June 11, 1923.

It is announced that Albert T. Bacon & Co., Chicago, have succeeded
to the practice conducted by the late Frederick F. Judd.
Hoenig & Hoenig announce the opening of an office in the American
Mechanics building, Trenton, New Jersey.

Lovejoy & 0’Donoghue announce the opening of a branch office in
the Second National building, Akron, Ohio.

William M. Raphael announces the removal of his offices to 151
Fifth avenue, New York.

Kaiser & Seiden announce the removal of their offices to 110 East 42nd
street, New York.
Joyce & Mattis announce the removal of their offices to 100 East 42nd
street,, New York.
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